Climate change litigation by Maljean-Dubois, Sandrine
HAL Id: halshs-02281274
https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-02281274
Submitted on 10 Sep 2019
HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access
archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci-
entific research documents, whether they are pub-
lished or not. The documents may come from
teaching and research institutions in France or
abroad, or from public or private research centers.
L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est
destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents
scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non,
émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de
recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires
publics ou privés.
Climate change litigation
Sandrine Maljean-Dubois
To cite this version:
Sandrine Maljean-Dubois. Climate change litigation. Max Planck Encyclopedia of Procedural Law,
2019. ￿halshs-02281274￿
From: Oxford Public International Law (http://opil.ouplaw.com). (c) Oxford University Press, 2015. All Rights Reserved. 
Subscriber: Sandrine MALJEAN-DUBOIS; date: 09 September 2019
Content type: Encyclopedia entries
Product: Max Planck Encyclopedias of International Law 
[MPIL]
Module: Max Planck Encyclopedia of International 
Procedural Law [MPEiPro]
Article last updated: June 2018
Climate Change Litigation
Sandrine Maljean-Dubois
Subject(s):
Actio popularis — Climate change — International courts and tribunals, procedure — Compliance with 
international decisions — Reparations — Responsibility of states — Environmental disputes
Published under the direction of Hélène Ruiz Fabri, with the support of the Department of International 
Law and Dispute Resolution, under the auspices of the Max Planck Institute Luxembourg for Procedural 
Law.
From: Oxford Public International Law (http://opil.ouplaw.com). (c) Oxford University Press, 2015. All Rights Reserved. 
Subscriber: Sandrine MALJEAN-DUBOIS; date: 09 September 2019
A.  Introduction
1  The damage caused by climate change is extensive and varied. It occurs on different 
timescales, with impacts ranging from extreme weather events such as intense rainfall, 
storms, hurricanes, etc to phenomena that appear slowly over time such as the rise of sea 
level, ocean acidification, ice mass loss, coastal erosion, loss of biodiversity, or declining soil 
productivity (Huggel and others, 2015, 453). Different spatial scales also come into play: 
mostly local, sometimes national (such as the rise of sea level wiping out a small insular 
State), potentially global (such as the impact of climate change on biodiversity, or in a 
larger sense climate change as a planetary boundary). Lastly, climate change harms not 
only the environment itself but also persons and property. These changes are already felt 
everywhere around the globe. Impacts are growing in frequency and severity. There is a 
risk that they will significantly worsen in the future depending on our greenhouse gas 
emission (‘GHG’) trajectories. The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (‘IPCC’) has 
contributed here to raising an international consensus based on solid foundations (Climate 
Change 2014 Synthesis Report, Summary for Policymakers [‘IPCC 2014 Report’], 2).
2  The human origin of climate change is no longer in question. According to the IPCC:
Anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions have increased since the pre-industrial 
era, driven largely by economic and population growth, and are now higher than 
ever. … Their effects … are extremely likely to have been the dominant cause of the 
observed warming since the mid-20th century (IPCC 2014 Report, 4) (emphasis in 
original).
Yet, while scientists consider that climate change is causing and will continue to cause more 
frequent and more intense extreme events, human causation with respect to specific events 
is impossible to establish or isolate. The causal link is perhaps easier to establish with 
regard to slow phenomena but it remains difficult nonetheless to separate the climate 
change factor caused by man, from other factors (solar or volcanic activity for instance) or 
to quantify the part of a particular country or group of countries. But science is advancing. 
Thus, for the first time, scientists have determined with certainty the link between human-
caused climate change and extreme weather events. They have established that some 
extreme events that occurred in 2016 simply could not have happened due to natural 
climate variability alone (Explaining Extreme Events from a Climate Perspective, 2017, 1).
3  Climate change has been rightly viewed as a ‘super-wicked problem’ from a policy and 
legal point of view (Lazarus, 2009, 1153). First, GHGs that contribute to global warming 
and, beyond that, to climate change, originate from a very large number of sources. A wide 
variety of actors are involved in climate change, from States themselves, to small and large 
businesses, farmers, and individuals who consume goods, heat their homes, or drive a car, 
etc. Furthermore, the emission of GHGs is not forbidden in and of itself; at best it is simply 
regulated. It is the cumulative effect of these emissions in space and in time that is 
problematic. Besides, the diffusion of GHGs in the atmosphere is so fast—a matter of days 
for CO2—that the effects of emissions are not related to the location of their source. The 
increase in GHG in a particular country or region of the world is thus likely to have 
consequences in very distant areas of the globe. At the same time, while Northern countries 
are taking on the historical responsibility for the current climate change, Southern 
countries are the ones who are paying and who will continue to pay the highest price. 
Indeed, climate change will impact all parts of the world unevenly and the most vulnerable 
populations will be most affected. Complex issues of international justice arise. It is not an 
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ordinary transboundary matter of ‘good neighbourly relationships’ but a global issue in its 
very essence, calling for extensive international cooperation.
4  States have designed a specific international regime starting with the United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change (‘UNFCCC’ or ‘Convention’) (1992), 
complemented by the Kyoto Protocol (1997) and the Paris Agreement (2015). These three 
treaties have been ratified by a large number of countries (as of 5 February 2018, the 
UNFCCC included 197 Parties, the Kyoto Protocol 192, and the Paris Agreement 173). 
States have been slow to implement this legal regime which is not sufficiently ambitious. It 
was not able to prevent the temperature rise that can already be felt and which, as 
previously mentioned, is likely to worsen in the future (The Emissions Gap Report 2017: A 
UN Environment Synthesis Report, 2017, xiv).
5  With the growing impacts of climate change rise the contemporary challenges of 
compensation for damages. Questions of responsibility and liability are arising and will 
continue to arise with increasing urgency, including between States. This is evidenced by 
the recent → International Court of Justice (ICJ) judgment which, even if the Paris 
Agreement is not mentioned, upholds Costa Rica’s claims regarding the role of trees in gas 
regulation and air quality services before valuating it (Certain Activities Carried Out by 
Nicaragua in the Border Area, Costa Rica v Nicaragua, 2018, para 86 [‘Certain Activities 
Carried Out by Nicaragua’]). In this context, it is paramount to clarify the responsibility of 
States in these matters and, therewith, the risks to which States are exposed. But States’ 
responsibility is not the only one that can be invoked. Those businesses that feature among 
the largest emitters and the banks and investment funds that finance them are also exposed 
to liability claims. Indeed, the past several years have seen an explosion of litigation over 
actions or inaction related to climate change mitigation and adaptation efforts, before 
subnational, national, and supranational courts and committees, pushing for more 
ambitious regulations, opposing regulatory steps or new plans and proposed developments, 
or even requesting compensation measures. Hence, according to the Sabin Center 
database, as of March 2017, climate change cases had been filed in 24 countries, with 654 
cases filed in the United States and over 230 cases filed in all other countries combined. 
With limited exceptions, governments are almost always the defendants in these cases (The 
Status of Climate Change Litigation – A Global Review, 2017, 10). These cases are as many 
as they are varied:
•  as to the claimants: States (vulnerable low-emitting States like small island nations, 
or virtuous States against less virtuous ones, etc), NGOs, businesses, individuals;
•  as to the defendants: States, businesses, banks, investment funds, even NGOs;
•  as to the object of the claim: lack of sufficient measures to fight climate change or 
to adapt to climate change, lack of sufficient funding to support Southern States, 
impacts of geo-engineering measures designed to fight climate change, or the 
challenge of large infrastructure projects (new coal-fired power stations, new 
airports, etc);
•  as to the forum: national or international courts;
•  as to the means of dispute resolution: it can be contentious or non-contentious.
Climate litigation can pursue an objective of compensation—triggered ex post in relation to 
the damage—but more often than not it primarily aims to play a preventive role (ex ante), 
trying to push for concrete action, to press legislators and policymakers to be more 
ambitious in their approaches to climate change and fill the gaps left by legislative and 
regulatory inaction (The Status of Climate Change Litigation – A Global Review, 4). Another 
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specific feature is that these highly publicized and globalized litigation cases are part of 
communication and awareness strategies. Then the outcome of the dispute, often a negative 
one, matters less than the orchestration of the communication campaign.
6  This contribution will endeavour to address climate litigation in all its forms. It will focus 
on international courts, tribunals, and adjudicative means of dispute resolution, including 
non-contentious and non-binding forms of adjudication, but also on domestic courts to the 
extent that international law is invoked and concerned. We will discuss how, at the 
international level, States have sought to avoid litigation by refusing to consider the issue of 
climate change in terms of their responsibility (see sec B below). Even though international 
law is rather ill-equipped to handle interstate disputes, this type of litigation could 
nonetheless be brought before an international jurisdiction (see sec C below). Because of 
the many hurdles thereto, our reflection cannot be limited to interstate litigation in its 
traditional form. Beyond that, climate issues can give rise to transnational litigation (see sec 
D below). Last but not least, the increasing number of climate disputes at the national level 
is in fact related to international law. National courts are required to lay down or apply 
rules of obvious international relevance (see sec E below).
B.  State Attempts at Avoiding Interstate Litigation
7  When breaching its international obligations, a State must respond to the grievances of 
the subject to whom it caused prejudice when violating the latter’s rights. As the Permanent 
Court of International Justice stated in 1928, ‘it is a principle of international law that the 
breach of an engagement involves an obligation to make reparation in an adequate 
form’ (Factory at Chorzów, Germany v Poland, 1928, 29). This obligation is even a very 
extensive one; it ‘must, “as far as possible” wipe out all the consequences of the illegal 
act’ (Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros Project, Hungary v Slovakia, 1997, para 150; quoting Factory at 
Chorzów, Germany v Poland, 1928, 47; see also → Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros Case (Hungary/
Slovakia)).
8  Nevertheless, in matters relating to the environment, States have long shown a certain 
defiance towards international jurisdiction mechanisms. Already in 1972, principle 22 of the 
Stockholm Declaration of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment
invited States to ‘cooperate to develop further the international law regarding liability and 
compensation for the victims of pollution and other environmental damage caused by 
activities within the jurisdiction or control of such States to areas beyond their jurisdiction’. 
Principle 13 of the 1992 Rio Declaration on Environment and Development also encourages 
this cooperation (see → Stockholm Declaration (1972) and Rio Declaration (1992)). Yet the 
subject is still characterized today by its poor conventional content. Case law has made 
little contribution to the development of a liability regime as almost all interstate disputes 
have been settled through the negotiation of compensation agreements, agreed to without 
any reference to international litigation rules (Boisson de Chazournes, 1995, 48), when they 
were not shifted towards international private law (Nollkaemper, 2006, 186). Several 
conventions are thus designed to facilitate the resolution of this type of disputes and to 
respond to the common challenge of loss and damage from environmental pollution. They 
establish legal regimes of private liability and compensation, ‘channelling’ the liability of 
operators by providing for the creation of compensation funds, by developing systems of 
strict liability, by assigning jurisdiction, or by ensuring the enforcement of rulings. However, 
this transfer of liability did not take place in all sectors; this only applies to certain 
activities, such as the transport of dangerous goods.
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9  The creation of a similar international regime with regard to damage caused by climate 
change would have constituted a welcome solution, given that private economic actors are 
largely responsible for damages suffered. But it was never seriously contemplated and only 
ever proposed by legal scholars (for instance Cullet, 2007, 99).
10  States have also failed to reach an agreement on a specific legal framework regarding 
their own responsibility. More than that, they have carefully avoided doing so when 
establishing the UNFCCC and later on the Kyoto Protocol and Paris Agreement. The 
UNFCCC recognizes that ‘the largest share of historical and current emissions of 
greenhouse gases has originated in developed countries’ and that developed countries must 
‘take the lead in combating climate change and the adverse effects thereof’, but it does not 
establish whether the special obligations of developed countries stem from their historical 
responsibility or simply from their greater capacities or their generosity. Admittedly, the 
principle of shared but different responsibilities and of respective capacities plays a key 
role in the international climate regime, and is referred to many times in these treaties. 
Nevertheless, whether this responsibility is causal or moral is not specified (Mayer, 2014, 
8).
11  States have opted instead for the implementation of → climate change compliance 
procedures. The climate change compliance procedure for the Paris Agreement is currently 
being negotiated, but the Paris Agreement provides that this mechanism will be ‘expert-
based and facilitative in nature and function in a manner that is transparent, non-
adversarial and non-punitive’ (Art 15 (2) Paris Agreement), thus clearly non-contentious. 
The mechanism put in place pursuant to the Kyoto Protocol is more ambiguous from this 
point of view. One of the most elaborate non-compliance mechanisms of international 
environmental law, it includes two branches, one of which (the enforcement branch) could 
almost be seen as jurisdictional. It can be called upon to settle actual legal disputes 
(Maljean-Dubois, 2007, 193). The system provides for specific sanctions for the failure to 
meet certain obligations, among them specific reduction targets; however, the mechanism 
does not deal with the legal consequences of climate change damages (Voigt, 2008, 1). The 
application of penalties is not intended as compensation for any injury caused by the non-
compliance, as would be the case in a State responsibility setting. Instead, the non-
compliance mechanism stipulates that the consequences applied by the enforcement branch 
‘shall be aimed at the restoration of compliance to ensure environmental integrity, and shall 
provide for an incentive to comply’ (Peel, 2016, 1009). We know that such mechanisms, 
because they are better suited for environmental matters, tend to marginalize traditional 
dispute resolution mechanisms, although they do not exclude them at least in theory 
(Koskenniemi, 1993, 123).
12  The creation of the ‘Warsaw international mechanism for loss and damage associated 
with climate change impacts’ follows the same trend. In response to the old and pressing 
demands of Southern countries, the Conference of the Parties (‘COP’) 19, in 2013, in 
Warsaw, finally put in place this mechanism, which was inserted in the Paris Agreement (Art 
8 Paris Agreement). Far from meeting the demands of developing countries, it is not a 
compensation mechanism for climate damage that involves the recognition of a form of 
international liability. The decision 1/CP.21 that accompanies and adopts the Paris 
Agreement is very clear on this point as it expressly specifies that ‘Article 8 of the 
Agreement does not involve or provide a basis for any liability or compensation’. It is in 
fact, once again, a mechanism set up to avoid States’ international liability that could 
nevertheless lead to the prevention, possibly even the compensation, of climate damage, not 
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by virtue of a recognition of an international liability but for reasons of solidarity in the 
context of a cooperation policy (Doelle, 2016, 622).
13  These are only attempts at marginalizing States’ responsibility, but its invocation 
remains possible. Within the Kyoto Protocol, it is clear that ‘the procedures and 
mechanisms relating to compliance shall operate without prejudice to’ the dispute 
settlement clause (Art 14 UNFCCC; Decision 27/CMP.1 Procedures and mechanisms 
relating to compliance under the Kyoto Protocol, 2005, 92). Moreover, some States—among 
small Pacific islands, such as Fiji—have made declarations specifying that their ratification 
‘shall, in no way, constitute a renunciation of any rights under international law concerning 
state responsibility for the adverse effects of climate change, and that no provisions in the 
[UNFCCC] can be interpreted as derogating from the principles of general international 
law’ (Fiji Declaration upon ratification of the United Nations Framework Convention on 
Climate Change, 1993). Kiribati, Nauru, Papua New Guinea, and Tuvalu have made similar 
declarations. Under the Kyoto Protocol, the Cook Islands, Kiribati, Nauru, and Niue have 
done the same. Even more such declarations have been made pursuant to the Paris 
Agreement (Marshall Islands, Micronesia, Nauru, Niue, Philippines, Solomon Islands, 
Tuvalu, and Vanuatu). The wording differs slightly sometimes. In that respect, the Cook 
Islands’ declaration is more specific, stating that ‘[t]he Government of the Cook Islands 
declares its understanding that acceptance of the Paris Agreement and its application shall 
in no way constitute a renunciation of any rights under international law concerning State 
responsibility for the adverse effects of climate change and that no provision in the Paris 
Agreement can be interpreted as derogating from principles of general international law or 
any claims or rights concerning compensation due to the impacts of climate change’ (Cook 
Islands Declaration upon ratification of the Paris Agreement, 2016). These declarations 
‘demonstrated their belief that the worst greenhouse gas emitters can still be held legally 
responsible for their actions’ (Koivurova, 2007, 267). Indeed, even though (or because) 
there are no → lex specialis secondary rules, nothing in the climate regime can be read as 
excluding the applicability of general international law with regard to damage caused by 
climate change (Voigt, 2008, 10). On the contrary, Parties’ awareness is reflected in the 
Preamble of the UNFCCC, which recalls that States ‘have the responsibility to ensure that 
activities within their jurisdiction or control do not cause damage to the environment of 
other States or of areas beyond the limits of national jurisdiction’ (UNFCCC, Preamble para 
8). Given the enormous scale of the impacts foreseen from GHG pollution, the particular 
vulnerability of many developing countries to these impacts, and advances in attribution 
science, the likelihood of legal action against major-emitting countries can only increase 
(Verheyen and Roderick, 2008, 37).
C.  Is Inter-State Climate Litigation Conceivable?
14  International law is often viewed as unable to provide an adequate response to these 
issues. According to Voigt, for instance, ‘international law is ill-equipped when confronted 
with a complex situation, such as compensation for climate change damages. Vague primary 
rules, multiplicity of actors, different types of damages and non-linear causation all pose 
significant challenges to the traditional law on State responsibility’ (Voigt, 2008, 2). Some 
small island States entertained the idea of interstate proceedings but were dissuaded on the 
grounds that this could have disrupted international negotiations on climate, which were 
already quite tense. For instance, Tuvalu, a small island State in the South Pacific whose 
land will be inundated within the next 50 years, announced in 2002 that it would take 
Australia to the ICJ (Koivurova, 2007, 267). Many contemplated litigation based on the 
insufficient outcome of the Copenhagen COP in 2009. In 2011, Palau, another small island 
developing State, initiated a campaign for the United Nations General Assembly to request 
an advisory opinion from the ICJ, but had to back out after the launch of the Durban 
negotiations and a fortiori when the United States threatened to interrupt the provision of 
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development aid (Beck and Burleson, 2014, 17). A sort of wait-and-see attitude then imbued 
the preparation and launch of the Paris Agreement, (almost) everyone now deeming the 
content of the Agreement to be insufficient but in any event both fragile and better than 
nothing.
15  It is true that climate change constitutes a challenge when considering the principles 
and conditions surrounding States’ international responsibility, whether one is looking at 
wrongful conduct, its consequences, or even at the enforcement of responsibility. The 
following discussion applies to States but also, for the most part, to any subject of 
international law (such as an international organization financing a project generating large 
GHG emissions).
1.  Wrongful Act: A Violation of International Law Attributable to a 
State
(a)  An Internationally Wrongful Act
16  The 1996 proposals of the International Law Commission (‘ILC’) 1996 proposals for 
making States strictly liable for significant transboundary harm proved to be too 
progressive and have been abandoned (see also Title and texts of the preamble and the 
draft principles on the allocation of loss arising out of hazardous activities adopted by the 
Drafting Committee on second reading, 2006, 1). Hence, the international liability of a State 
may only be incurred on the basis of an internationally wrongful act. It is a well-established 
principle that ‘every internationally wrongful act of a State entails the international liability 
of that State’ (Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts 
[‘2001 ILC Draft Articles’], 2001, 2). Thus, the responsibility of the State results from the 
violation of international law, regardless of its consequences. It can be a breach of 
conventional or customary international law that may be committed through an act or 
omission. Indeed, the remarkable development of States’ primary obligations is related to 
both the multiplication and increasing precision of conventional obligations, but also to the 
strengthening of a foundation made of customary rules. In both respects, the densification 
of State obligations mechanically increases the potential for litigation. Consequently, the 
breached primary obligation can be found within the specific climate change legal regime 
but also in other special regimes and general international law.
17  Treaty law is the main source of obligations in international environmental law, 
containing more specific obligations than customary law. Depending on the States involved 
in an international litigation on climate change, the UNFCCC, the Kyoto Protocol, and the 
Paris Agreement are directly relevant. Whether the UNFCCC imposes legally enforceable 
obligations is disputed in the literature. The predominant view appears to be that as a 
framework convention it does not stipulate enforceable primary legal norms of international 
law, but provides a general framework whose rules lack specificity and are subject to the 
treaty’s compliance procedures only (Schwarte and Byrne, 2010, 1). Regarding the 
reduction of GHG emissions, the most specific provision, Article 4 (2) UNFCCC, provides 
that Parties ‘shall adopt national policies and take corresponding measures on the 
mitigation of climate change, by limiting its anthropogenic emissions of greenhouse gases’. 
Although vague, this provision ‘stipulate[s] a commitment’ and ‘arguably could be the basis 
of a liability claim’ (Faure and Nollkaemper, 2007, 123; Voigt, 2008, 6). Similarly, one could 
also think of Article 4 (4) UNFCCC which established a ‘commitment’ to ‘assist the 
developing country parties that are particularly vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate 
change in meeting costs of adaptation to those adverse effects’, or even of Article 5 
UNFCCC (technology transfer). For its part, the Kyoto Protocol set out more specific and 
quantified obligations, in particular with regard to the reduction of GHG emissions. Because 
they are specific, these obligations could be a basis for litigation. Lastly, the Paris 
Agreement sets out a general objective that is more detailed than the one found in the 
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UNFCCC and in the light of which it must be interpreted: ‘[h]olding the increase in the 
global average temperature to well below 2°C above pre-industrial levels and pursuing 
efforts to limit the temperature increase to 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels’ (Art 2.1 (a) 
Paris Agreement). The obligations laid down in this agreement are essentially procedural. 
Regarding mitigation, the obligation is not really substantial as ‘each Party shall prepare, 
communicate and maintain successive nationally determined contributions that it intends to 
achieve. Parties shall pursue domestic mitigation measures, with the aim of achieving the 
objectives of such contributions’ (Art 4 (2) Paris Agreement). But the Party contribution 
shall ‘reflect its highest possible ambition, reflecting its common but differentiated 
responsibilities and respective capabilities, in the light of different national 
circumstances’ (Art 4 (3) Paris Agreement). This implies ‘a due diligence standard which 
requires governments to act in proportion to the risk at stake’ (Voigt, 2016, 158).
18  Other conventions could also be relevant, such as the United Nations Convention on the 
Law of the Sea (‘UNCLOS’) and others treaties combating pollution of the marine 
environment, the Montreal Protocol on substances that deplete the ozone layer, or treaties 
seeking to reduce long-range transboundary air pollution. One could also think of the 
Convention on Biological Diversity, the UNESCO World Heritage Convention, or even 
human rights treaties. Very limited case law exists in this regard. For instance, an 
application has been made by environmental organizations and private citizens to include 
several sites on the List of World Heritage in Danger, on the basis of Article 11 (4) World 
Heritage Convention, because climate change threatens the future of these sites, including 
the Himalayan mountain range (Thorson, 2009, 255). Several petitions were also made to 
the World Heritage Committee raising the prospect of GHG emissions causing damage, 
through climate change, to World Heritage sites such as the Great Barrier Reef in Australia 
(Peel, 2016, 1009).
19  Without getting into too much detail, climate treaties and other conventions provide a 
fragile basis to support a finding of State liability given that the obligations are vague, 
attenuated, sometimes conditional, and often indirect. That is why it is interesting to also 
examine the possibility of invoking, in and of itself or in addition to the violation of a 
conventional obligation, customary obligations. From this point of view, the obligation not to 
harm the environment in other States or the environment in areas beyond national 
jurisdictions (the so called ‘no-harm rule’) provides an interesting lead. It is an old rule that 
recent case law has clarified while highlighting potential implications. Thus, it is not an 
obligation not to cause damage, but a positive obligation, a duty of due diligence. States 
must act with due diligence in order to ensure to the highest possible extent that dangerous 
activities which are being carried out on their territory or within their jurisdiction do not 
cause harmful consequences. This obligation is extremely wide. It is an obligation of 
‘means’ and not of results: ‘an obligation to deploy adequate means, to exercise best 
possible efforts, to do the utmost, to obtain this result’ (Responsibilities and Obligations of 
States Sponsoring Persons and Entities with Respect to Activities in the Area, 2011, 39
[‘Responsibilities and Obligations’]). It is very strict: ‘it is an obligation which entails not 
only the adoption of appropriate rules and measures, but also a certain level of vigilance in 
their enforcement and the exercise of administrative control applicable to public and 
private operators, such as the monitoring of activities undertaken by such operators’ (Pulp 
Mills on the River Uruguay, Argentina v Uruguay, 2010, para 197; see also → Pulp Mills on 
the River Uruguay (Argentina v Uruguay)). The → International Tribunal for the Law of the 
Sea (ITLOS) Chamber has even considered that the ‘precautionary approach is also an 
integral part of the general obligation of due diligence’ (Responsibilities and Obligations,
para 131). Moreover, the general duty of due diligence includes a number of procedural 
obligations (information, notification, cooperation, impact assessment, and continuous 
monitoring) that could also be relied upon successfully in the context of litigation regarding 
large infrastructure projects (the construction of a pipeline), industrial projects 
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(construction, on a large scale, of coal-fired power plants) that emit a lot of GHG, or on the 
contrary geo-engineering projects designed to mitigate climate change.
20  This broad interpretation of due diligence, the customary nature of which is 
established, has significant consequences for States. Due to its ‘umbrella’ character, due 
diligence could make up for the potential shortcomings of treaties. Beyond its preventive 
role, it paves the way for increasing litigation based on an increasing knowledge of the 
thresholds not to be crossed in order to ‘prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference 
with the climate system’. It is all the more interesting in a matter like climate change that 
this direct obligation of the State has an indirect impact on private stakeholders within the 
State’s territory or jurisdiction, who are responsible for a very large part of GHG emissions. 
Due diligence is also seen as an attractive basis for State responsibility claims for climate 
change damage as it is binding on all States, including major emitters who lack specific 
emissions reduction obligations under the Kyoto Protocol or Paris Agreement (Peel, 2016, 
1009). It is in any case an interesting basis that could be relied upon in addition to 
conventional ones. Indeed, the customary obligation of due diligence complements 
conventional obligations, keeping in mind that to this day the commitments to reduce 
emissions pursuant to conventions are inadequate and insufficient to ‘prevent dangerous 
anthropogenic interference with the climate system’. A State may comply with its 
conventional commitments while failing to comply with its customary obligations. As for 
conventional obligations, they must be interpreted in the light of the customary obligation, 
which can result in broader obligations. In practice, conventional and customary due 
diligence obligations mutually feed and shed light on each other. The recent award on the 
South China Sea perfectly reflects the catalysis, possibly even the symbiosis, that can take 
place between these different kinds of obligations (The South China Sea Arbitration, The 
Republic of Philippines v The People's Republic of China, 2016, paras 941–48). Thus, 
despite being vague, the customary basis can remain relevant, including in the case of a 
dispute between two States that are Parties to the Paris Agreement.
21  It is now established that state of necessity is one of the circumstances that can 
preclude a finding of wrongfulness. Could a State invoke necessity to be exonerated from its 
obligations to prevent and limit climate change, and more generally of all its obligations on 
this matter? Economic necessity in particular could be argued, given the States’ 
development imperatives. The International Center for Settlement of Investment Disputes 
(‘ICSID’) arbitral tribunals have accepted that a catastrophic economic situation 
threatening the living conditions of a population could justify a state of necessity (Metalpar 
SA and Buen Aire SA v Argentine Republic, 2008, para 208). On the other hand, the ICJ has 
accepted the possibility of an ecological state of necessity (Gabčikovo-Nagymaros Project, 
para 51). Yet, even though it is easy to compare emissions per capita, which can differ 
significantly from one State to the next, to this day there is no consensus as to what would 
constitute necessary emissions—required for subsistence—and what would be deemed 
superfluous emissions. Thus, this route seems rather complicated, except perhaps in the 
most extreme case of the lowest or largest emitters. Perhaps the actual carbon footprint of 
a State should be taken into account, excluding emissions related to exports. This seems all 
the more difficult given that necessity is construed in a restrictive manner to avoid any 
abuse. Besides, necessity can justify the violation of international law only to the extent that 
it ‘does not seriously impair an essential interest of the State or States towards which the 
obligation exists, or of the international community as a whole’ (Art 25 (1) 2001 ILC Draft 
Articles). This is another hurdle that subjects of international law must overcome to be able 
to rely on necessity to escape liability.
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22  Considerations as to whether the responsible States had the opportunity to take 
preventive action, the foreseeability of harm, and the proportionality of the measures 
chosen to reduce the harm, will also be relevant to the determination of the standard of 
care the State has to follow (Peel, 2016, 1009). Moreover, this standard of care is not set in 
stone. It evolves over time alongside scientific and technological knowledge and in space, 
depending on the different capacities of States, which themselves also evolve over time. As 
years go by, States’ obligations become increasingly onerous, lightening in equal measure 
the burden of proof. Foreseeability of harm continuously improves, thanks in particular to 
the work of the IPCC, some of it at least being co-decided with representatives of States. 
Proportionality also evolves with scientific knowledge. It requires an assessment of the 
balance between the defendant’s and the claimant’s interests. Yet the risk involved for some 
States, in particular small island States, is so great, including substantial or even total loss 
of territory, that only significant reduction measures of GHGs could be considered 
proportionate (Voigt, 2008, 13). Further to the Stern Review in 2006, a significant number 
of economic papers have established that the costs of inaction would ultimately become far 
greater than the costs of action (Stern, 2006, ii).
(b)  Attributing Harm to a State
23  For a State to be found liable, a causal link must be established between the harm done 
and the violation of international law. In theory, a State is only responsible for the actions of 
public authorities and of its own entities, not for those of private individuals—who are 
responsible for the most part of GHG emissions—except indirectly if it does not comply with 
its due diligence obligations in this respect. Thus, in principle, a State cannot be held 
responsible on the basis that its GHG emissions have caused harm, but because it has failed 
to take necessary and adequate measures in order to regulate emitting activities carried out 
within its territory or jurisdiction. From this point of view, a State is accountable for 
activities on its territory and under its effective control. In other situations, the lack of 
action by public authorities has been condemned (Armed Activities on the Territory of the 
Congo, Democratic Republic of the Congo v Rwanda, 2005, para 180; → Armed Activities on 
the Territory of the Congo Cases), as well as normative initiatives by legislators that 
contradicted a conventional covenant (Metalclad Corporation v The United Mexican States, 
2000, paras 109–11). As found by the seabed disputes chamber of the ITLOS, ‘it is not 
considered reasonable to make a State liable for each and every violation committed by 
persons under its jurisdiction, it is equally not considered satisfactory to rely on mere 
application of the principle that the conduct of private persons or entities is not attributable 
to the State under international law’ (Responsibilities and Obligations, para 112). Similarly, 
an international organization could be held liable both for the initiatives of its normative 
bodies and for the actions of its services (Art 4 Draft Articles on the Responsibility of 
International Organizations [‘2011 ILC Draft Articles’], 2011).
24  As mentioned above (see para 2), the human origin of climate change is no longer in 
question. It has been established by IPCC reports. Nevertheless, the climate system is 
complex and not linear. Even though there are clear estimates of different countries’ 
relative contributions to the absolute tons of GHGs emitted globally, at least since the 
1990s, sources of emissions are varied, vague, and untraceable. Thus, while the overall 
causation leaves no doubt, the same cannot be said of specific causation.
25  With regard to due diligence obligations, however, the burden of proof is less 
challenging. Indeed, it will be easier to show that a State has failed to take all the measures 
it should have taken. Proof must be provided not as to the existence of a risk but as to the 
lack of implementation by the State of legislation and regulation that would have enabled 
such State to be made aware of such risk, to assess its probability and gravity, and to take 
measures in order to avoid its occurrence. Proof of such failure is not particularly difficult 
to establish (Kerbrat and Maljean-Dubois, 2014, 929). Indeed, as due diligence obligations 
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are obligations of conduct, it is not necessary to prove that the environment was 
substantially harmed (except at a later stage when determining the right method of 
compensation) but simply that the State has failed to meet its obligations of conduct by not 
having taken all the measures that should have been taken.
26  Climate change constitutes a challenge for international law, but the latter has shown 
on many occasions its ability to adapt. A number of leads would be worth looking into, even 
though the standard of proof that would be accepted by an international jurisdiction 
remains unclear. As a matter of fact, each GHG emission increases the risk of specific harm 
by adding, in cumulative terms, to the GHG already present in the atmosphere. Thus, one 
could suggest that causation could be established on the sole basis of contribution to the 
problem of climate change by a specific actor. The issue of how much damage might have 
been caused by this contribution is irrelevant in this respect, although it will play a role at 
the stage of apportioning costs (Voigt, 2008, 16). It must be pointed out that the fact that 
the injury was at least partially caused by the polluting activity of the Trail Smelter in 
Canada appeared to be sufficient (Voigt, 2008, 15; Trail Smelter Case, 1938, 1941; → Trail 
Smelter Arbitration). Or that, in another case, a proximate cause was found, largely based 
on empirical interpretation (Preliminary Decision No 7, 2007, para 13). In spite of the 
developments of scientific knowledge, it is still relevant to consider whether the 
precautionary principle could not lighten the standard of proof (Faure and Nollkaemper, 
2007, 1588). Indeed, we may not be in a context of uncertainty as to the overall causation 
any more, but the determination of specific causation does remain subject to uncertainty.
2.  Consequences of the Internationally Wrongful Act
27  Under international law, as in any other legal system, a legal rule can be divided into a 
main or primary obligation, the obligation to comply, and an ancillary or secondary 
obligation, which is to correct the consequences of non-compliance. Even though any 
internationally wrongful act by a subject of international law gives rise to liability, if no 
direct harm was done the responsibility will remain theoretical and will not result in actual 
consequences; unless a State engages the responsibility of another State for an indirect 
harm, but this time exercising the diplomatic protection in respect of its nationals. That 
said, harm is construed in a wide sense here as it is now established that ‘injury includes 
any damage, whether material or moral, caused by the internationally wrongful act of a 
State’ (Art 31 (2) 2011 ILC Draft Articles).
28  Only affected subjects will be entitled to seek the liability of the author of the wrongful 
act, and the concept of injured State has long been construed in a strict manner. The 
existence of a real and actual dispute is a condition to litigation. The ICJ uses a narrow 
definition of the term ‘dispute’, thus restricting the borders of litigation and scope of action 
(Mavrommatis Palestine Concessions, 1924, 11; → Mavrommatis Concessions Cases). 
Eliminating ‘virtual’ or ‘abstract’ disputes, it considers that there is a dispute, in the judicial 
sense, when a State has a claim that is legally opposed to a claim from another State. In 
order for a dispute to exist, the two sides must hold clearly opposite views as to the 
performance or non-performance of certain international obligations. Moreover, a dispute 
exists when the evidence demonstrates that the respondent was aware, or could not have 
been unaware, that its views were positively opposed by the applicant (Obligations 
concerning Negotiations relating to Cessation of the Nuclear Arms Race and to Nuclear 
Disarmament, Marshall Islands v India, 2016, paras 33–40). The issue is thus not only about 
opposed legal views. Indeed ‘it must be shown that the claim of one party is positively 
opposed by the other’ (South West Africa, Ethiopia v South Africa, Liberia v South Africa, 
1962, para 328; see also → South West Africa/Namibia (Advisory Opinions and Judgments)). 
In the → Northern Cameroons Case, the ICJ declared that ‘it would still be impossible for 
the Court to render a judgment capable of effective application’ since it was neither asked 
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to ‘address the alleged injustice’, nor to ‘award any reparation’. It thus reaffirmed that its 
function is indeed to guarantee the rule of law but ‘in connection with concrete cases where 
there exists at the time of the adjudication an actual controversy involving a conflict of legal 
interests between the parties’ and that the decision ‘must have some practical 
consequences in the sense that it can affect existing legal rights or obligations of the 
parties, thus removing uncertainty from their legal relations’ (Northern Cameroons, 
Cameroon v United Kingdom, 1963, para 15).
29  Thus, in general, international law does not recognize actio popularis (→ Obligations 
erga omnes; → Community Interest; → Barcelona Traction Case), that is to say the 
possibility for any State to help establishing the responsibility of another State that 
breached international law. In 1966, the Court stated that ‘although a right of this kind may 
be known to certain municipal systems of law, it is not known to international law as it 
stands at present’ (South West Africa, Ethiopia v South Africa, Liberia v South Africa, 1966, 
para 47; see also the dissenting opinion of Judge Jessup, 387–88). This principle does suffer 
one exception: erga omnes obligations, since they create omnium rights. The Court has 
already referred to this notion explicitly and repeatedly, for instance concerning the 
Convention on genocide (Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment 
of the Crime of Genocide, Bosnia and Herzegovina v Serbia and Montenegro, 1996, para 31; 
see also → Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of 
Genocide Case (Bosnia and Herzegovina v Serbia and Montenegro)). The principle inherent 
to this concept is that all States have a legal interest to act when such an obligation is 
breached (Barcelona Traction Light and Power Company Ltd, Belgium v Spain, 1970, para 
32; see also Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian 
Territory, 2004, paras 87–88; → Israeli Wall Advisory Opinion (Legal Consequences of the 
Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory)). The idea here is not to invoke 
a subjective right any more, but rather an objective interest for the respect of legality. This 
leads directly to an actio popularis, even a limited one. Most obligations that are contained 
in environmental treaties seem to fit into the category of ‘interdependent’ obligations, 
according to which it is sufficient, in order to establish an interest to act, to be a Party to 
the treaty whenever it is impossible to single out third persons or Parties as creditors of the 
obligation (Santulli, 2015, 240). The 2001 ILC Draft Articles allow for the possibility that 
any State other than an injured State may invoke the responsibility of another State if ‘a) 
the obligation breached is owed to a group of States including that State, and is established 
for the protection of a collective interest of the group; or b) the obligation breached is owed 
to the international community as a whole’ (Art 48 2001 ILC Draft Articles). It follows from 
commentaries issued by the ILC that paragraph (a) concerns mainly obligations related to 
the protection of the environment (2001 ILC Draft Articles, 126, para 7). And yet, the ITLOS 
Chamber used this provision of the ILC project to consider that ‘each State Party may also 
be entitled to claim compensation in light of the erga omnes character of the obligations 
relating to the preservation of the environment of the high seas and in the 
Area’ (Responsibilities and Obligations, para 180). We may observe here an important 
clarification that could facilitate the invocation of the responsibility of a State or of a group 
of States for climate damages.
30  The first consequence when a State is found liable is that the internationally wrongful 
act must end if it is still ongoing. But the responsible State—or organization—is also ‘under 
an obligation to make full reparation for the injury caused by the internationally wrongful 
act’ (Art 31 2001 ILC Draft Articles). This reparation ‘takes the form of restitution, 
compensation and satisfaction, either singly or in combination’ (Art 34 2001 ILC Draft 
Articles). The ICJ has confirmed that compensation may be an appropriate form of 
reparation, particularly in those cases where restitution is materially impossible or unduly 
burdensome (Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay, Argentina v Uruguay, 2010, para 273). 
However, it recalled recently, in the → Ahmadou Sadio Diallo Case (Republic of Guinea v 
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Democratic Republic of the Congo), that, in order to award compensation, the Court has to 
determine ‘whether there is a sufficiently direct and certain causal nexus between the 
wrongful act … and the injury suffered by the Applicant’ (Ahmadou Sadio Diallo, Republic of 
Guinea v Democratic Republic of the Congo, 2012, para 14; quoted in Certain Activities 
Carried Out by Nicaragua, para 32). Except by interpreting causation in a very loose way or 
by applying probabilistic theories, it will be difficult in the current state of scientific 
knowledge to establish a ‘direct and certain causal nexus’ between a climate damage and 
the emissions of a particular State or group of States. Thus, it will be difficult to obtain the 
restitutio in integrum or even a financial compensation for the material prejudice, even 
without taking into account that it might in fact be physically impossible to restore the 
situation ex ante. In the meantime, it is worth noting that the ICJ has no difficulty with the 
compensation of environmental damage. Even if it has not previously ‘adjudicated a claim 
for compensation for environmental damage’, it recently considered that ‘it is consistent 
with the principles of international law governing the consequences of internationally 
wrongful acts, including the principle of full reparation, to hold that compensation is due for 
damage caused to the environment, in and of itself, in addition to expenses incurred by an 
injured State as a consequence of such damage’ (Certain activities carried out by 
Nicaragua, para 41). Moreover, the ICJ recalls that ‘the absence of adequate evidence as to 
the extent of material damage will not, in all situations, preclude an award of compensation 
for that damage’ and that ‘[i]n such case, while the damages may not be determined by 
mere speculation or guess, it will be enough if the evidence show the extent of the damages 
as a matter of just and reasonable inference, although the result be only 
approximate’ (Certain activities carried out by Nicaragua, para 35; quoting Trail Smelter 
Case).
31  Let us imagine a Pacific State, A, seeking the liability of an industrialized State, B, for 
the damage incurred on its territory (eg sea level rise and ultimately disappearance, 
extreme climate events, etc) on the basis of State B’s failure to comply with its due 
diligence obligations. By bringing a claim based on due diligence, State A avoids the 
delicate issues surrounding the attribution to State B of the conduct of private individuals 
and companies that have emitted the most part of the GHGs causing climate change. 
Furthermore, State A no longer has to prove the responsibility of State B in the changes 
State A is suffering from. It must simply establish that State B did not set sufficient 
emissions reduction targets. Thanks, in particular, to the work of the IPCC, it will be quite 
easy to establish that State B has failed to act with the required due diligence. Material 
compensation of the harm caused will be more delicate as the question will arise as to 
whether, and to what extent, the harm can be attributed to State B. As it happens, it is 
impossible to trace the gas emitted within State B’s territory or jurisdiction and to ascertain 
its share of responsibility for the harm done to State A (except for relying on presumptions 
made from emission data). Even though the delicate issues surrounding compensation are 
thus not all resolved, an international court could easily find that State B breached its due 
diligence obligation. State A would most likely not see it as an adequate response but it 
could have an impact on State B’s conduct, as well as, down the line, the conduct of other 
large emitters. In that case, responsibility is not about compensation for a material 
prejudice but about restoring legality and preventing further harm. An international court 
could also request the parties to find a solution to their dispute through negotiation in good 
faith and cooperation. This would be consistent with international case law (for instance, 
Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay, Argentina v Uruguay, 2010, para 81 et seq) and the work 
of the ILC on the protection of the atmosphere (Voigt, 2016, 163).
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32  If it is established that the violation constitutes ‘a serious breach by a State of an 
obligation arising under a peremptory norm of general international law’, the draft project 
of the ILC provides for specific consequences in addition to those existing under common 
law. On the one hand, ‘States shall cooperate to bring to an end through lawful means any 
serious breach’ of this kind. On the other hand, ‘[n]o State shall recognize as lawful a 
situation created by’ such ‘a serious breach’ ‘nor render aid or assistance in maintaining 
that situation’ (Art 41 2001 ILC Draft Articles).
33  The liability of a State is not limited by the fact that one or several other States are 
responsible for the same internationally wrongful act (Art 47 2001 ILC Draft Articles). Each 
State can therefore be held separately and individually liable; however, the extent of a 
State’s contribution to the damage will be taken into account at the compensation stage. 
The Commentary to Article 47 makes it clear that each responsible State is liable only for 
the harm it individually causes. Thus, ‘in the determination of reparation, account shall be 
taken of the contribution to the injury by wilful or negligent action or omission of the 
injured State or any person or entity in relation to whom reparation is sought’ (Art 39 2001 
ILC Draft Articles). This issue is particularly relevant with respect to climate change, but 
even beyond that, with respect to a significant number of cross-border pollution cases. 
International law will have to provide some answers. A few principles could be relied upon, 
such as the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities and respective 
capabilities, but they are far from offering ‘turnkey’ solutions. There are only a few, 
incomplete scientific studies that could be relied upon by a court (for instance Summary 
Report of the ad hoc group for the modelling and assessment of contributions to climate 
change, 2007, 1).
34  Given that it is the cumulative effect of GHG emissions by several—all—States that is 
causing harm, the question arises as to whether States that are contributing 
(independently) to an internationally wrongful act can be held jointly and severally liable. 
The effect would be that the victim could choose to sue any of the injurers falling within the 
joint and several liability regime and claim full compensation from any of them. The injurer 
who would have to fully compensate the victim could then in turn claim from the other 
wrongdoers the amount which they contributed to the loss (Faure and Nollkaemper, 2007, 
165). This principle can be found in most legal systems but its existence in international law 
is far from established.
3.  Enforcing State Responsibility
35  Even when a State can convincingly show that one or more other States are responsible 
for the violation of a primary international legal obligation that forms part of their mutual 
relationship, there are limited judicial avenues through which redress can be sought 
(Schwarte and Byrne, 2010, 15). Even if a basis for litigation can be found in substantive 
law, it will generally be difficult, in certain cases impossible, to find procedural means to 
bring a successful claim. The injured State will face the hurdle of the principle of consent to 
international jurisdiction. In the event of a dispute, it will thus be difficult to find a forum 
with jurisdiction, unless the respondent State accepts such jurisdiction once the dispute has 
come to light; an unlikely scenario.
36  The settlement of disputes clause in Article 14 UNFCCC provides a theoretical basis for 
a liability claim. Article 14 (1) provides that the Parties ‘shall seek a settlement of the 
dispute through negotiation or any other peaceful means of their own choice’. If this fails, 
Article 14 (2) includes an optional jurisdictional settlement clause: Parties may make a prior 
declaration (when ratifying or at any time thereafter) that they recognize submission of the 
dispute to the ICJ or to arbitration (in accordance with procedures that were supposed to be 
adopted by the COP but were not). In the event that neither the ICJ nor an arbitral tribunal 
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may be seized, Article 14 (5)–(7) provides for conciliation. This clause applies mutatis 
mutandis to the Kyoto Protocol (see Art 19) and to the Paris Agreement (see Art 24).
37  These provisions are not suited for the resolution of disputes arising out of the 
interpretation or application of multilateral conventions adopted for the defence of a 
‘collective interest’ (Art 48 2001 ILC Draft Articles). Indeed, in fear of a boomerang effect, 
States are reluctant to rely on them for the ‘sole’ defence of a collective interest. While for 
years these clauses were never relied on and could be viewed as having been included only 
as a matter of form, they recently provided a basis for several arbitration rulings: for 
instance, between the Netherlands and France (The Audit of Accounts between the 
Netherlands and France, 2004). However, in these cases, contrary to what is provided in 
Article 14 UNFCCC, the constitution of an arbitration tribunal could be requested 
unilaterally; the agreement of the parties to the dispute was not required.
38  Reliance on these provisions to challenge a violation of the Convention is possible in 
theory. This is all the more true that the concepts of ‘dispute between any two or more 
Parties concerning the interpretation or application of the Convention’ or of injured State, 
which define their scope of application, should, in this case, be construed in a rather large 
sense. The core of the climate regime, featuring obligations and means to reduce emissions, 
most likely falls into the category of erga omnes partes obligations—obligations that apply 
to all Parties to the treaty, be it the Convention, the Kyoto Protocol, or the Paris Agreement. 
For this type of obligations, a ‘universalisation of liability relationships’ could and should be 
recognized (Sicilianos, 2003, 169).
39  Yet, in practice, the UNFCCC dispute settlement clause cannot be invoked. The fact is 
that it was not met with great success: out of the 197 Parties to the Convention, the 
Netherlands is the only country that recognized the jurisdiction of the ICJ and the 
possibility of arbitration proceedings, while the Solomon Islands and Tuvalu have accepted 
compulsory arbitration according to Article 14 (2) UNFCCC. Given the requirement for 
reciprocity, the clause could therefore be relied upon only between the Netherlands and 
Tuvalu and the Solomon Islands, or between Tuvalu and the Solomon Islands. Of course, 
States can always submit their dispute to such jurisdiction after its occurrence, but this 
scenario is, once again, very unlikely.
40  Nevertheless, litigation could arise in other fora with compulsory jurisdiction such as 
the Dispute Settlement Body of the WTO (‘DSB’) (→ International trade disputes), for 
disputes related to the application of the UNFCCC, of the Kyoto Protocol, or of the Paris 
Agreement. This possibility was brought up several times in connection with the challenge 
of proposals for carbon tax border adjustments; however, the outcome of these disputes is 
uncertain. The DSB can only intervene insofar as the dispute involves two or more Members 
of the WTO and has a trade-related dimension: the special group potentially put in place 
would naturally rule ‘in the light of the relevant provisions’ of WTO law (Art 7 
Understanding on the Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, Annex 2 
to Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization). This could be the case even in 
disputes involving a WTO Member that is not a Party to the climate treaties. This is in fact 
the scenario that would involve the most severe conflicts. However, even if all States 
involved in a dispute were Members of the WTO as well as of the Kyoto Protocol or Paris 
Agreement, panels do not have the power to articulate these two legal spaces. It is true that 
the WTO Appellate Body has clearly stated, in its very first ruling, that the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 is not to be read ‘in clinical isolation from public 
international law’ (United States – Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline, 
1996, para 16). However, the → Biotech Case showed later that an environmental 
convention—in this instance, the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety to the Convention on 
Biological Diversity (‘Cartagena Protocol’)—could not be seen as being part of the law 
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applicable for the purposes of resolving a dispute within the WTO. According to the opinion 
adopted by the panel, which to this day has not been overturned given the absence of any 
appeal, for it to be the case, all Members of the WTO would have to be Parties to the 
Convention on Biological Diversity. Applied to climate change, this ‘case law’ prevents 
reliance on climate-related conventional law to interpret the WTO law, at least on the basis 
of Article 31 (3) (c) Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (‘Vienna Convention’), given 
that the United States or Canada are WTO Members but not Parties to the Cartagena 
Protocol, or that a dozen of States are WTO Members and not Parties to the Paris 
Agreement, among them Russia or Turkey (European Communities – Measures Affecting 
the Approval and Marketing of Biotech Products, Panel Report, 2006, paras 7.73 et seq; 
European Communities and Certain Member States – Measures Affecting Trade in Large 
Civil Aircraft, Appellate Body Report, 2011, paras 844–45; for an (unsuccessful) utilization 
of the UNFCC, see India – Certain Measures Relating to Solar Cells and Solar Modules, 
Appellate Body Report, 2016, paras 7.285–7.301).
41  Other conventional mechanisms could come into play, such as the ones provided in the 
UNCLOS (Part XV), the United Nations Fish Stocks Agreement (Part VIII), the Montreal 
Protocol on substances that deplete the ozone layer (see in particular Art 14 with Art 11 
Vienna Convention), or the Convention on Biological Diversity (Art 27), other supervisory 
bodies of international treaties, conciliation procedures, advisory opinions of the ICJ, or 
even the ITLOS, which has proven to be more progressive. While the relevance of a request 
for an advisory opinion from the Court could have been called into question during the 
negotiations that lead to the adoption of the Paris Agreement in 2015, the situation is now 
different. Advisory opinions are not binding, but they do provide an authoritative statement 
on questions of international law. As States’ national contributions are significantly 
insufficient to reach the objectives of the Paris Agreement, it could be the right time for the 
Court to clarify the rights and obligations of States on the matter, including, most 
importantly, on the basis of customary law (Koran and Garcia, 2012, 35).
D.  Transnational Climate Litigation
42  Climate litigation can also be transnational, involving claims by private persons or 
subnational actors against States, or even private persons against multinational companies. 
Climate damage can also give rise to complaints before bodies protecting human rights by 
‘ricochet’ by relying on the right to life, right to health, or right to respect for the home. 
This is evidenced by the Inuit's 2005 petition to the Inter-American Commission on Human 
Rights claiming that US climate change policy violated the human rights of its US and 
Canadian citizens by failing to adopt adequate GHG controls. The US was still the largest 
cumulative emitter of GHG emissions at that time. The petition was dismissed but it did 
succeed in drawing public attention to the severe effects of global warming on the Inuit, 
and instigating further discussion about the human rights implications of climate change 
(The Status of Climate Change Litigation – A Global Review, 31). One should also mention 
the ruling of the Federal Court of Nigeria considering that Shell’s flaring of methane from 
its gas production activities on the Niger Delta violated human rights to a clean and healthy 
environment protected under the Nigerian constitution and the African Charter on Human 
and Peoples’ Rights (Gbemre v Shell Petroleum Development Company Nigeria Limited and 
Others, 2005; The Status of Climate Change Litigation – A Global Review, 31). Indeed, with 
climate damages increasing, it would seem appropriate to explore the role of human rights 
bodies (Wewerinke-Singh, 2017, 22).
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43  Transnational disputes may in particular occur in the context of → international 
investment arbitration, with claims relating to environmental measures adopted by 
governments (Fuentes Torrijo, 2016, 309). The trend towards investment in renewable and 
low carbon energy industries has also given rise to a growing number of arbitrations at the 
→ Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) under the Energy Charter Treaty, NAFTA, and 
bilateral investment treaties (‘BITs’; → Investments, Bilateral Treaties) relating to solar, 
wind and hydropower investment (Miles, 2017, 26). This is also the case under the ICSID 
Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of 
Other States. For example, a Swedish investor, the owner of a coal-fired power plant near 
Hamburg, has initiated arbitration against Germany before an ICSID tribunal, claiming that 
additional environmental restrictions to reduce the plant pollution in the Elbe River were 
imposed after the provisional approval of the project in 2007 and that they constitute a 
violation of its right to a fair and equitable treatment (Vattenfall AB, Vattenfall Europe AG, 
Vattenfall Europe Generation AG v Federal Republic of Germany, 2009). There is also a 
growing number of investment arbitrations relating this time to the enactment of legislative 
measures reducing or withdrawing economic support mechanisms previously introduced in 
support of renewable sources of energy (Dias Simões, 2017, 174).
44  Lastly, a claim before the accountability mechanisms of the international financial 
institutions could also be contemplated, be it the World Bank inspection panel or the 
International Finance Corporations’ Compliance Advisor and Ombudsman. They provide 
potentially useful opportunities to raise climate-related concerns regarding projects 
financed by the World Bank or other international financial institutions (Gleason and 
Hunter, 2009, 311).
E.  International Law and Domestic Climate Change Litigation
45  Admittedly, international courts ‘have themselves become new social actors, ones that 
contribute to evolutions in the state of human consciousness and actions’ (Sands, 2016, 
889). Yet international courts do not appear to have sufficient political legitimacy to set 
precedents with potentially tremendous consequences on the world’s order and to persuade 
States to implement the courts’ decisions (Mayer, 2014, 19). In these circumstances, control 
at the national level is to play a crucial role. The development of national climate litigation 
is not a new phenomenon, but it is now ‘booming’, initiated by a wide variety of claimants, 
from farmers to a group of grandmothers, cities, a law student, or groups of children. 
Opposite them are States, and large emitters such as the fossil fuel industry, or those 
financing them. In these cases, climate defenders’ requests are rarely granted, but that is 
almost secondary. What matters equally, if not more, is the successful mediatization at the 
global level of these cases that are real communication stunts. Furthermore, national 
litigation does have a link with international law. Such litigation is increasing because of the 
slow implementation of an ambitious international climate regime, claimants seeking to 
make up for the gaps and shortcomings thereof (Peel and Osofsky, 2015, 338).
46  Yet, national climate disputes also benefit from international negotiations and State 
commitments, and even from the recent clarifications regarding the customary ‘no harm’ 
rule. Claimants rely on factual data gathered pursuant thereto (eg a stocktake of GHG 
emissions prepared since the 1990s pursuant to the UNFCCC, elements presented in 
reports prepared by States), on scientific arguments (the legitimacy and authority of IPCC 
reports in particular are widely recognized), and on legal arguments (eg the objective of 
limited global warming set out in the Paris Agreement, or national contributions as 
unilateral declarations capable of creating legal obligations). They can also rely, in a less 
direct way, on a law that implements a State’s international commitments. Here, the Paris 
Agreement provides more of a breeding ground conducive to national litigation, rather than 
legal arguments as such. While the Paris Agreement does not assign each country a carbon 
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budget, it does offer a basis for deducing a budget from national commitments. It also 
makes clear that policies leading to net increases in emissions are disfavoured (The Status 
of Climate Change Litigation – A Global Review, 17). The Dutch Urgenda case has 
contributed to creating a powerful incentive for national climate trials: the Court found that 
the Dutch government had a duty to take more ambitious mitigation measures, by virtue of 
national law, European law, and international law (the ‘no harm’ rule for instance, or the 
sustainability principle embodied in the UNFCCC) (Urgenda Foundation v The State of the 
Netherlands, 2015). In the New Zealand case of Thomson v The Minister for Climate 
Change Issues, 2017 (‘Thomson’), while denying the claimant’s plea, the High Court of New 
Zealand recognized that the national emissions targets should be reviewed with regard to 
IPCC reports (Thomson, para 178) after stating that ‘the IPCC reports provide a factual 
basis on which decisions can be made’ (Thomson, para 133). The court reviewed national 
policy and in particular the national contribution of New Zealand to the Paris Agreement, in 
the light of the requirements, minimal in substance, laid down by the Agreement. The court 
concluded that ‘neither the Convention nor the Paris Agreement stipulate any specific 
criteria or process for how a country is to set its [intended nationally determined 
contribution] and [nationally determined contribution], nor how it is to assess the costs of 
the measures it intends to take’ (Thomson, para 139). Thus the claimant did not succeed in 
establishing the unlawful nature of the national contribution (Thomson). The Swiss 
grandmothers case, Union of Swiss Senior Women for Climate Protection v Swiss Federal 
Council, still pending, relates to the adequacy of the Swiss government's climate change 
mitigation targets and implementation measures. The claimants have underlined the 
objectives laid down by the Paris Agreement, and argued that Switzerland was not creating 
the conditions to meet these objectives. Other cases are leading claimants to assert that 
their respective governments’ legal commitments to climate change mitigation are 
consistent with and articulated through ratification of the Paris Agreement (one dealing 
with the expansion of Vienna’s airport in Austria, another one with licenses for deep-sea oil 
and gas extraction in the Barents Sea in Norway, a last one in Sweden with the sale of coal 
mines and coal-fired power plants in Germany by a State-owned energy company; The 
Status of Climate Change Litigation – A Global Review, 219). Now that the control 
mechanism of the climate regime is going to be less strict than it used to be, there is a 
growing need for a ‘handover’ between the international and the national level. It has been 
shown that these two control mechanisms fit into a sort of ‘circular continuum’. They 
mutually support and feed each other. Yet they are not interdependent and have very 
different characteristics that plead in favour of a combination rather than a substitution 
(Tabau, 2017, 220).
47  Climate change litigation ‘provides a valuable complement to treaty, legislative, and 
executive action because it fosters needed interaction across levels of 
government’ (Osofsky, 2009, 377). If States do not raise the level of ambition of their 
national contributions to the Paris Agreement, if they do not honour their financial and 
technology transfer commitments, climate litigation cases and adjudicative approaches 
could skyrocket in the years to come, not only at the national but also at the international 
level.
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